Environmental Variables and the Realisation of State Objectives in International Relations by Nwozor, Agaptus
rlrTtn1lATl0llAl
IELATION!
IN A NEWWORLD ORDER
'xrrF
lr,:+ =elrrrlil 
q lll *llc Wilt lrl, tll:ll!7 ,.:rir e'= rl:':t =
l'elelEll lllqt lltlltrt: rl:'='':f '= | r! ' =rrLie:t lllltEEF
of lllell rllqr llrltrr'' il., i Fr rlEltlc
t
vl
APPI'€EIAI111f 1 uf lltr' -,="t I'l-' 'l; ' ' ='i ' il'-- "r l:l il
stfltlc, lt lr rlyttatilti lt= 'l,rr'*ii':=':i " 't= = =rl;=
fOnlllelll ftlf t,t'llr 'tl 'f;'1' 1r i"' = l' 
l''i i :l
ntatloll lo eltl;rlt lr ,tl ,1lr;, " ;' l'tl
,tl€rllllrr ttl lttl''t 't"" " " ''t t = : 
ll=++
-., := ,it 
=!.: ;, =, tr+l-il:t
::..:i l;.;l .
+,' i 51, [:al
'orld Qrd€r' lq dll tlrlrlttt'rli l:; tl
wot'lrl,A ttcw rilrf lrl i= ri'rl- i' :=:r t
e fend), Allll ltltsf irll:til l" * lt-rll. ";'
nl<lng", Aq (llll ltrv ;*rllrl= "'* !::!: :' 'I
curlty rlttlrrlrl 113: f rtll alE'rl irt rl''' ; ' . I t;rriil+B!i .. .,, EllEfggE,' Httttl.lll ltll.ilF:=l lrrE=-*r= il'= = " =i=
lC mfltel'ldl att,l llull lli'llFr i':l ;'-- l= t :l =
llFfWheltttltr$ lilrtfrrt llf ;'l tlr'. ;'l't"= I = , i t =t =Fla
thg Under tlev:'|il;rt'rl I .rilr,l i' = ! ' I- : :1,. =ia






































ronmentol Vanablesand the Reolisotion 




Environnftesltm$ VariahEes effid 
€he




States do not evolve their foreign 
policy obleetives in isolation'
The formulation uf iat* obiectives is maie 
witnin the precincts of
domestic and external environmeRt' 
What this impiies is that
foreign policy obiectives of states are 
produc.ts of 
'environmental
variables. When we talk of environmental 
variables we are
referring to the d;g;; socio-cultural' econornic 
and politieal
forces that exist 'J'nE 
domestic and externai spheres and 
which
motorise and dete#ine whot constitutes 
state obieetives' how
states arrive u, tf'"'"'tU1*"tives and 
why smtes Pursue thern and
with whattlitlt'rnu.*, 
are the rnalor acror^s in the international
arena, there are other actors categorised 
as sub-state and non-
state actors" These actors exert the 
same Pressure and influence
as states. What this means' in essence' 
is that these actors relate
in a compl"* **y *"d this eornplex reiationship 
determines the
influences on ,,,'u*'Jblutuuu'' Stopford 
& Strange (199t) have
terrned these t"*pi*"- relations in the international 
arena as
triangular aipr*m"t['iti*ng'tu' ciiplomacy 
encomPasses the range
-
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of relationships in the international arena such as state-stir(r
relations; transnational corPorations-transnational corPorati()lr',
re lations an d state-tran snati onal co rpo rations re lations.
There is a direct relationship between state obiectives atr'l
state capability. While a state could set uP diverse goals based orr
its national interest, what determines the realisation of these gorl.'
is its capability defined in terms of its level of economic attrl
political development, its set of interests and the Power at iL5
disposal to actualise these interests and the nature of its nationrl
leadership. An important point to note is that it is not every
objective outlined by a state that it has the capability to Pursuc
and realise.
A major determinant of the capability of states to articulatc
and realise their foreign policy is their positioning in the
international capitalist system. The closer a state is positioned at
the centre, the more likely it could enioy some independence in
the formulation, pursuit and realisation of its obiectives. ln
contrast, a state that is at the fringe is most unlikely to realise its
objectives without interference from the states occupying the
centre. The economic crisis, poverty and political instability,
among other negative attributes that characterise Third World
Countries have made it impossible for them to be the real
architects of their domestic and foreign policies.
This chapter examines the domestic and external
environmental variables that act as triggers and drivers of state
objectives. lt also interrogates the link between these
environmental variables and the forces that conduce to the
realisation of state obiectives. The chapter holds that
environmental variables are not only the motorising force that
spawns state obiectives but also contributory factor in their
realisation.
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Tht' Building Blocks:
Tlrr. State in the Arena of lnternational Relations
llrr, rrrrcr-national arena is filled with a multiplicity of actors that
trr,ry ',rrrrply be categorised as state, sub-state and non-state act'ors'
flrri ,l,,rgriie the increasing role, prominence and influence of sub-
qt,rtr, ;rnd non-state actors in the international arena, the state
|r.nr,rirrs the cornerstone of international relations (Hobson 2000;
I,rkr. 2007). Although non-state actors such as the international
ilr)ngovernmental organisations, transnational corPorations'
,,,1lional and continentil organisations and inter-continental and
y,l,,i;:rl organisations are relevant and important in international
r ,'l;rtions and have exerted far-reaching influence on the
rcsolution of international issues, one way or the other' the
r crrrrality of the state is that it has continued to remain the
t onduit or agency through which such resolutions are made and
trffcctuated.
The state is a legal entity that embodies sovereignty' political
institutions, population, geographic region or territ'ory'.relatively
coherent and autonomous system of government' legitimate
rnonopolyofforce,andbodyoflaws.Therehavebeenvarious
concePtions of state ranging from legal, philosophical' sociologieal
to poiitical. No matter the ideological conception of state, it is a
concrete manifestation of the "culmination of rnan's struggles in
settled life, embodying and expressing the common int'erests of
the dominant class wiihin the system, and .f its derivative ruling
class within the government, both of whom are able to attain and
sustain such pre-eminence by various designs' including the
ultimate application of authoritative force" (lgwe 2002:416-7)'
lmportantly, the state is the "realm of collective action and
decision" (Balaam & Veseth 2005:13)'
Thus, whether the state is conceptualised holistically and
equated with the country or disaggregated and differentiated from
the society and government (Thomson 1995)' or as puhlic
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bureaucracy and administrative collective incorporating a set of
personnel who occupy positions of decisional authority in policy
formulation and implementation (Nwozor 2012), or the totality of
the materiality of political class domination in a society (lbeanu
1998), or specific modality of class domination or class-related
phenomenon (Okolie 2005) or "a creature of the basis, and most
decisive element of the superstructure of society" (lgwe
2002:416), the state is the reason for, and motorising force of,
international relations. ln contemporary times, there have been
challenges to the dominance of the state as a major organising
force in the international arena as a result of the phenomenon of
globalisation.
The emergence of globalisation and its obfuscation of state
boundaries led liberal interdependence theorists to contend that
the state had become irrelevant or dead in international relations
(Hobson 2000). Their argument rested on the unfolding
interdependence and erosion of state sovereignty through
"economic interdependence, global-scale technologies, and
democratic politics" (Thomson 1995:215). Essentially, sovereignty
is one of the major attributes of statehood. lt encapsulates "the
possible powers of independent statehood, including
constitutional and legislative supremacy, which entitle its
government to make and implement its own decisions in domestic
affairs and in conduct of international relations, without the prior
consent or permission of an outside power" (lgwe 2002:412). The
implication of the last point is that through the instrumentality of
sovereignty, a state is, by and of itself, independent and possesses
unquestionable authority or what Thomson (1995:214) refers to
as "meta-political authority", that is, the ultimate political
authority which the state wields without restrictions from any
quarters, domestically and internationally.
The contradiction which globalisation introduced in relation
to the sovereignty of the state is the erosion of its traditional
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lrlrrnrhrics of authority. While sovereignty presupposes the
rllrc,,rrt c of contending entities either within the state or outside
It, lllobalisation symbolises the dismantling of these boundaries.
llr,, rore of the arguments of liberal interdependence theorists is
tlr,rt tlrc complex interdependence which globalisation epitomises
arll lrromotes undermines the capacity of states to control their
lr,,rrlcrs. Thomson (1995: 215) summarises how this manifests
tlrrr,,,
Modern technology empowers nonstate or substate
actors to evade state efforts to control the flow of
goods, people, money, and information across
territorial boundaries. Capital, especially, can flow to
another state or another currency to escaPe state fiscal
and monetary policies. Efforts to defend cultural values
or ban subversive ideas are stymied by computer and
telecommunications technologies in the hands of other
states and substate and nonstate actors. At the same
time, technological advances have produced weapons of
mass destruction which preclude the state from
protecting its own people or territory. As a result
states cannot ensure economic or military security.
State-centric theorists refute the retreat of the state in
tilrcr-national relations. There are two strands in the arguments of
rr,rtc-centric theorists. Thomson (1995) identifies these strands as
rlrc denial that interdependence has increased and therefore that
ir,r[c sovereignty has been eroded. This denial is anchored on the
r orrtcntion that "current ratios of trans-border to within-border
llows of people, information, and capital are not dramatically
rlrffcrent from those of the late nineteenth century. lf these ratios
,r c reasonable measures of interdependence, then
rntcr-dependence is not on the rise and does not reflect an
r.r osion of sovereignty" (Thomson 1995:21 5). The second strand
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is tlre rationalisation and aPProPriation of the expansion in
interdependence as a dePiction of the enhancement of state
power and authority (Thomson 1995)' Thus, the complex global
interdependence, manifesting in expansion in trans-border flows'
advances in technological develoPment and dismantling of barriers
to global financial flo*, .rong others, is predicated on the
exercise of state Power (Gilpin 1987)'
Although other actors exist in the international arena and
exercise undue influence, they have not been able to dislodge or
diminish the state from its position of dominance. The continued
relevance of the state in international relations is acl<nowledged
both at the theoretical and practical levels. At the theoretical
level, Lake (2007 l) avers,
Many analysts focus on states and their interactions to
explain observed Patterns of world politics' The st'ate is
fundamental to neorealism and neoliberal
institutionalism.ltisalsokeyinmanyconstructiVistand
English school theories. Even critical, postmodern' or
feminist theories, which have arisen in opposition to
existing forms of social Power, often focus on
problematizing srates and state Practice'
At the Praetical level, the dominance of the state is
underlined by the fact that non-state actors owe their allegiance
to one or more states. ln other words, all sub-state and non-state
actors have linkages with states and often rely on these states to
push their interests in the international arena. But the financial
strength of transnational corporations (TNCs) and the quest of
,art", to attract foreign direct investment (FDl) to boost their
economies have conferred upon them state-level powers' The
financial power of TNCs is demonstrated by the statistics that
revealed their relative strength to states. For instance, out of
world's 100 largest economic entities in 201 0, 47 Percent were
I ttvttrtntttt,ntol Voriobles ond the Reolisotion of Stote Objectives in lnternotionol Relotions I87
eorporations. lf the number is extended to evaluating the top 150
cconomic entities, the proportion of corPorations rose to 58
percent. Extending the analysis further by relying on the 2010
dataset of top economic entities, what is revealed is that the
largest TNC, Wal-Mart Stores, earned revenues that exceeded
th; GDPS of l7l countries making it the 25'h largest economic
entity in the world as well as ranking ahead of Norway and lran,
and employing 2.1 million people or the equivalent of 43% of
Norway's population (Keys & Malnight 2012). However, Balaam &
Veseth (2005:387) have argued that comParing the state and
TNCs in strictly monetary terms while ignoring other factors
could be misleading. There are several attributes possessed by the
state which non-state actors, like the TNCs, do not possess and
that is where the dividing line lies. For instance, states Possess
territories and make binding laws therein, they have sovereignty,
citizens; and various cateSories of law-enforcement agencies. All
these confer legitimacy on them that induces international
recognition of their decisional authority (Balaam & Veseth 2005;
Lake 2007).
Notwithstanding the financial Powers of major transnational
corporations (TNCs) which place them ahead of many states, they
are incapable of acting as states. As Lake (2007: l) has observed,
,,states decide to go to war. They erect trade barriers. They
choose whether and at what level to establish environmental
standards. states enter international agreements, or not, and
choose whether to abide by their provisions". But the dominance
of the state in international relations does not undermine or
diminish the relevance and influence of non-state actors, especially
the TNCs. TNCs have been known to be used by, and served as,
tools of developed countries' hegemonic control, providing the
platform for triangular diplomacy (Risse-Kappen 1995; Stopford &
Strange I99l; Balaam & veseth 2005). Triangular diplomacy
describes the pattern of state-TNC relations that set the
f-ttvironmentolVoriablesondtheReolisotionofStoteobjeaivesinlnternotionolRelotionslsg
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parameters for the direction of FDls which are both important to
the states as well as to the TNCs. The importance of state-TNC
relatiCIns has been summarised by Balaarn & Veseth (2005:399)
thus,
what Do states want? FrarmEn'ag state obieetives
in Internatiomal Relations
Smtes do not have urriforrn obiectives. Every state is nnotivated to
pursue certain goals based on, anrj in accordanee with, its overall
national interest. Each state deterrnines what it considens vital and
hierarchizes sarne in the order of im"lportance' However' the
TNCs today face more cornPetition than ever from
other TNCs. States face more competition with states
for the pool of FDI flows' Attempts to reach agreement
on a set of "rules of the game" to govern state-TNC
relations have failed at exaitly the time when it would
be rnost useful to have them' Lacking in such
agreement, the triangular Pressures on state-state'
INC-TNC, and state-fNC negotiat'ion will increase and
the political and econornic struggles"' will grow more
desperate.
Despite the conrplexity of contemporary international
relations, tire place of the state is incontrovertible' As Waltz
(1g7g,93-94) argues, "states are not and never have been the
only international actors....The irnportance of non-state actors
and the extent of transnational activities are obvious'" States
remain both the obiects and units of analysis, with sub-state and
non-state actors being ancillary to, althourgh not inferior in
relevance in the schem"e of things in the lnternational arena. This
is so because the formulation ant pursuit of state oblectives often
tnanscend state influence and find expression and fulfillment in the
domain of non-state actors.
objectivesofstatesarenotformulatedinisolationbutwithinthe
prrriu* of the obiectives of other states' Why this is so is that
the formulation and pursuit of antagonistic objectives could
snowballintobelligerentrelationshipscapableofthreateningthe
stability of the international system' The obiectives of states
constitute, not lust the thrust of, but the essence 
of their foreign
policy. The thiust of foreign policy is synonymous with what
sates consider imPortant foi their wellbeing and maintenance and
they are determined by both domestic and international
environmental factors (Okolie 2009)'
Foreign policy is a set of doctrines or principles' a Process'
or specific !et'of decisions which encapsulates the raison d'6tre of
state interaction in the international arena. Essentially, 
the foreign
policiesofstatessettheagendaforrelationsintheinternational
arena. Often a state's o6lective is anchored on its ideology'
ldeology serves as a calibrating device that stipulates' and 
even
determines, the choices which a state makes' ldeology is the
worldviewref|ectingthematerialconditionsandthesystematised
beliefs or ideas thaiform the basis of state organisation as well 
as
underpin the actions of leaders (Nweke 1986; lSwe 2002)'
gu..rt" states adopt ideologies that could either Put them into
cooperative or competitive relationships in the international
arena, foreign policy b".o'"' a product of actions' inactions and
reactionstocomPetinSinterestsofstates.Thisobservation
underpins lgwe's 
'.on.iptu"lisation of foreign policy as "the
.oordinatedlpplication of the elements of national power 
for the
promotion of tire national interest as defined by the ruling class 
in
relations between states and other international actors,'




against t-he'former USSR. The negativity of^id.eology in
driving foreign policy has been underlined by Hunt (1987:6) 
when
he asserts, .,ideoloiies blinker and blind, obscuring reality 
and
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justifying in the name of high causes extreme inhumanity rrll
wanton destruction".
As already observed, state obiectives are not uniform anrl
are often antagonistic, especially when states Pursue diametrically
opposed ideotgies. The effect which ideology has had on thcr
formulation of state obiectives led Hunt (1987:6) to emphasise thc
imperative of "a more orderly, clearheaded formulation of policy
built on well-defined national goals, displaying a firm grasp of
international conditions, and leading to the mobilisation of power
sufficient to overcorne anticipated obstacles and realise the
desired goals". Every state encapsulates its obiectives in their
consritutions or legai codes, and their policies, both domestically
and internationally, are guided and driven by these obiectives' lt is
not iust enough for a state to outline its obiectives. lf a state 
ends
only in outlining its objectives without the requisite capability for
their implementation, ih"t" obiectives could only stagnate at the
realms of utopianism. What this implies is that foreign policy has
components t-hat are necessary for its pursuit and implementation.
The motorising force of foreign policy is embedded in the
bouquetofcapabilitiesatthedisposalofastate'whichitcould
"rpioy 
to enable their realisation. Such capabilities include
economic, political, military, technological and scientific
advantages, which collectively constitute national Power'
State oblectives could be diverse depending on the level of
development which a Particular state enioys, its set of interests'
the power at its disposal to actualise these interests and its
national leadership. lt will be inconceivable that countries of the
developing world and their counterParts in the developed world
would have the same obiectives and capabilities for their
actualisation. Essentially, the maior determinant of where states fit
in global hierarchization is the degree of the sophistication of their
cafabilities. For instance, the disrnantling of the cold war.edifice of
bipolarism and its replacement with multipolarism anchored on
US ascendancy conferred hegemonic powers on the US' This
Altered the thrust of its core tblective from the containment of
rlval communist ideology to PreoccuPation with maintaining
unassailable influence across the world, using its enormous
national power to bring it into being. corollary to .exercising
influence across the globe is the PreoccuPation with-dismantling
terrorist networks. ilembers of the UN Security Council also
share the same concerns in varying degrees based on the
composition of their national interests and the level threats
against them.
Despite the multiplicity of state interests' a temPlate could
be developed to outline what states want that could shape their
objectives. Again, it is not every obiective outlined by a state that
it has the .ufiUitity of pursuing. The practicality of state objectives
is driven by 
i'realiitic interesti and attainable goals that reflect the
country,s geopolitical situation,' (Petrovic & Novakovic 2013).
This is so because the same level of importance is not accorded
to every item on the list of state obiectives. Most states have
institutions charged with the conduct of their foreign policy
iO["fi" 2009), bit despite their existence, the political elite 
and
,arau offi.i"ls often determine the composition and thrust of the
objectives of states as well as their international behaviour (lgwe
2002; Nnoli 2003).
Despite the irreducible foreign policy prescriptions
encapsulatedinnationalconstitutions,thespeechesofpresidents
and.headsofgovernmentsettheparametersthataddfleshand
lir"ction to ttieir foreign policy. For instance, Barak Obama' the
president of US, has travelled round the world' and on such trips
he often made speeches, that set the parameters of US foreign
policy and obiectives' As Scherer affirms, Obama has gone round
the world "offering his international vision: a hodgepodge of
classic real pol iti k, di plomatic determ i nation, community-organizer
idealism and charismatic leadership. He has presented what he
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Eze (2009) has done that "the Sreater the natural resources
at the disposal of a state, the Sreater it will have influence in
international affairs since the resources will facilitate the
bargaining power of states". Possessing these resources
alone without developing the right technology as well as
other institutional capacity to exploit and Process them
locally might not position a state to oPerate from a position
of strength. While African states are home to an assortment
of natural resources, none oPerates from a position of
strength. This paradox gave rise to such phrases as "Dutch
disease" and "resource curse" syndromes.
Socio-economic structure: The socio-economic structure of a
state refers to the social and economic forces at play in that
state to foster development. lt includes the structure of its
production, social relations and overall economic indices
that show the healthiness or otherwise of the national
economy. A state that has a high level of unemployment due
to low absorptive capacity, or whose economy is not
effectively in the hands of its citizens or that is dependent on
importation for its needs may not be truly independent and
may be unable to fashion independent foreign policy
objectives. The dependency syndrome that characterises
third world economies is a product of the incapacity of their
national economies to indePendently fend for themselves'
Again, the level of sophistication of an economy in terms of
its productive forces and level of diversification determines
its relative strength in the international arena. Thus, a state
with mono-cultural economic base, no matter the type of
product and its saliency internationally, is structurally
incapacitated to Pursue a vigorous foreign policy (Nweke
1986; Eze 2009).
Nationol morale: National morale simply denotes the general
level of belief and confidence which citizens exude toward
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their countries. lt is national morale that powers patriotism
and loyalty of citizens' As Morgenthau (1985: I 53) has
observed, "national morale is the degree of determination
with which a nation suPPorts the foreign policies of its
Sovernment in Peace or war"' National 
morale is dependent
Ln the degree to which a state is meeting its obligations to
the citizens. A state that deviates from the political typology
upon which the citizens voted its government into Power 
or
ishiiackedandpersonalisedbythepoliticaleliteorisunable
to protect its people or provide for them may not exPect
highmor^alefromitscitizen.Highnationalmoraleisvitalfor
the realisation of state obiectives in the international 
arena'
o Domestic institutions for notional integrotion: Most states are
made up of various grouPs which are motivated by 
diverse
interests. These divisions could be in the form of classes'
ethnicity,religiousaffiliationorsocio-culturalpluralism'
Every ,,ra" op""r,tes through a constitution or other forms
oflegalcodeswhereinmodalitiesforfrictionlesscoexistence
are embedded. Where institutions for the seamless
integration of disparate interests within a state are not
effectively oPerational, the pursuit of foreign policy 
might be
imperilled as it would be perennially preoccupied with
addressing domestic tensions'
Apart from domestic environmental variables' there are 
external
variables that impinge oh, and dictate the thrust of state
obiectives. External lnvironm"ntal variables are the gamut 
of
factorsthat,areoutsidetheterritorialsphereofastatebutwhich'
nevertheless, have multiplier effects on the traiectory of its
foreign policy. External environmental variables include:
o Regionol, continentol and internotionol organisotions: The
internationalarenaisfilledwithvariousorganisationswhich
are basically differentiated by size or the interest they
a
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represent. lnternational organisations operate at different
levels: while some are formed on the basis of geopolitical
boundaries, others are differentiated on the basis of
governmental involvement and yet others on the non-
lpyelvement of governments. Although these organisations
are called international because they operate beyond
territorial boundaries of states, their internationality is
derived from their building blocks which are the states
(Udalla 2012). lnternational organisations are effective fora
fep defusing likely tensions among states and even building
bridges among states for a more effective cooperation and
collaboration (lgwe 2002). Many organisations have birthed
multilateral agreements thar dictate the traiectory of the
foreign policy of states.
Bilorcrol, multiloterol or unilateral ogreements: as actors in the
international arena, states enter into agreements to enhance
their objectives. When a state enters into an agreement
with another state, it falls under the purview of bilateralism.
When the agreement is between a state and several others,
it is multilateral. But when a state decides to go it alone by
pursuing its preferences, it is unilateralism. An important
point to note on the last point is that while unilateralism
fundamentally promotes a state's interests, it adequately
takes the interests of other states into account in the
pursuit of those interests (lg*e 2002). The foreign policy
objectives of states build upon the positive attributes of
agreements reached by states at any or all of these levels for
two important reasons, namely for the purpose of
preserving the integrity of a state in the comity of states; and
for the stability of the international system.
Globolisotion ond neoliberolism: The aim of globalisation is to
erect a seamless integration of the whole world. The
universalisation of the world coincides with the rolling back
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of the boundaries of states and the "emergence of a global
society in which economic, political, environmental' and
cultural events in one part of the world quickly come to
have significance for people in other parts of the world"
(Tabb iooa:np1. The logic of globalisation is anchored on
neoliberal theoretical formulation with emphasis on free
market, free trade and democratisation (Nwozor 7012).
With emphasis on economic reforms and the expansion of
the political sPace through democratisation' globalisation
utilises the mechanism, tf lnt"tnational Monetary Fund
(lMF), World Bank and World Trade Organisation (WTO)
ao ,""a the goals of universalising the globe' Thus' foreign
policy of stites, especially the .economic and political
components must conform to this global trend to be
realisable.
Climate chonge: Climate change is a direct consequence of
centuries of anthropogenic exploitation of nature' The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) set the Parameters of what climate change is 
in
Article I section 2, where it denoted it as "a change of
climatewhichisattributeddirectlyorindirectlytohuman
activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere
and which is in addition to natural climate variability
observedovercomParabletimeperiods''(citedinNwozor
201 3:164). The negative effects of climate change manifest in
the depletion of Ih" oron" layers that protect the earth
from harmful solar radiation and the distortion of the
climactic condition with multiplier effects on the capacity of
states to fend for themselves without global cooPeration
and collaboration. As Nwozor (2013:165) explains'
The phenomenon of climate change is more like an
octopus with its tentacles clawed into every area of
a
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development through the environment. The
environmental consequences of climate change such as
flooding, drought, desertification, soil degradation,
erratic rainfall patterns, heat stress, disease and pest
outbreaks on crops and livestoci< impact negatively on
livelihoods, socio-economic orders, peace and conflicts,
political stability and sustainability of economies.
The increasing effect of climate change on global
productivity and the imperative of global action to tackle its fallout
have direct effect on foreign policy objectives of states.
o Food security and poverty: lt was held by the World Food
Summit in 1996 that food security exists "when all people, at
all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient,
safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and
food preferences for an active and healthy life" (FAO
2006:l). Essentially, food security connotes the availability
of food (in the right varieties, nutrients and quantities),
unhindered access to . it and appropriate use based on
knowledge of basic nutrition and care. ln other words, if
there is no food or the quantity is such that there is a
possibility that it may not meet the dietary requirements of
a state or access is restricted by whatever reason, or
knowledge about nutritional facts of the food is lacking, then
there is no food security. Poverty is generally a state of lack.
Poverty comprises many dimensions ranging from relative to
absolute. A state of povercy is characterised by low incomes
arising from unemployment, underemployment or non-
employment; the inability to acquire the basic goods and
services necessary for survival with dignity; Iow levels of
health and education; poor access to clean water and
sanitation; inadequate physical security; and inadequate or
absence of opportunity to better one's chances of good life
(Offiong 2001; World Bank 2001; Okolie 2010). Despite the
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progress made in reversing the trends of poverty (defined as
living below US$ 1.25 per day), which World Banl< sources
claimed plummeted from 52 percent in I98 I to 7l pencerrt
in 2010, it is estirnated that some I biilion people would strll
be living in extreme poverty hy 2015 (World Banl< nd). The
state of food security and level of poverty impinge on the
capacity of states to articulate their oblectives and punsue
same.
Low of the seo and oceon politics: The oceans and seas are
important to states both for navigation and the enormous
resources hidden in their treasures. These resources have,
for centuries, been sources of tension arnong states. lt was,
therefore, part of global efforts to reduce the prospects of
tension, its escalation and degeneration into military actions
that the law of the sea was signed by states. The law of the
sea, which was a product of three UN Conventions that
started in I 958, was signed in 1982 and came into effect in
1994. The essential features of the law of the sea include the
fixture of a state's territorial waters at 17 nautical miles;
right of innocent passage to foreign commercial vessels
through the l2-mile exclusive zone; free passage to all
vessels and aircraft beyond states' exclusive zones; exclusive
rights to coastal states to the fish and marine iife in warers
extending 200 nautical miles frorn shore; and, exclusive
rights to every state that has a continental shelf to the oil,
gas, and other resources in the shelf up to 200 miles from
shore (Vul<as 2004; Tanalca 2009; Churchill nd; Encarta
Encyclopaedia 2008). To safegr.tlrd poor countries of the
world as well as those that are technologically bacl<ward, the
law designated the minerals and other resources dorniciled
on the ocean floor beneath the high seas as "the common
heritage of mankind." The implication of this is that the
exploitation of such minerals will be collectively governed.
a
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The law also set Production ceilings for such minerals to
prevent economic harm to land-based producers of the
same minerals. Foreign policies of states must iuxtapose 
all
these provisions with their obiectives in order to avoid
being on a collision course with other states'
Terrorism: Terrorism has assumed a new dimension in 
global
affairs. This attention is traceable to the September I I '
2001 attacl<s on the United States' Terrorism connotes
p."m"Oitrt"a, deliberate and targeted deployment of
violence or threat of violence to bring about certain
envisaged outcome or chains of outcomes' Terrorism relies
on the creation and exploitation of fear as its maior 
tool of
accomplishing its objectives (Abonyi 2006)' Terrorist
networks have assumed a complex web and pose serious
threats to states' There have been global efforts to undercut
the livewire of terrorist networks and their sponsors' 
The
fight against terrorism has reshaped the foreign policy 
thrust
of many countries, leading to bilateral and multilateral
a8reements. ^ _ _.
Nucleor weopons, ormoment ond disormoment: A maior
component of national Power is one which confers the 
tag
of superiority on the armed forces of a state' is the
possession of nuclear weaPonry' This understanding
underpins the quest by states to develop capability in
nuclear Power manufacturing' What conferred Power 
on'
and attracted international resPect to, the superpowers 
of
the cold war era was their possession of this capability' 
The
possession of nuclear weaPons by states alters Power
configuration in interst'ate relations' The Potential 
dangers of
unregulated access to nuclear capability have led to. global
restrictions on nuclear weaPons development' Thus' a
country with the resources to build nuclear capability for
*uupon, development would definitely have the
international community to contend. with' 
Presently' lran'
Pakistan, lndia and Xf"tift Kot"u are 
facing various forms of
inquiries from the international community 
on account of
their nuclear Programmes'
Democrotisotion onJ human rights: 
ContemPorary wave of
democratisation is'" t;;P";nt of globalisation 
and it is
directed at setting uP accountable 
governments around the
globe. The international emphasis on 
democratisation was
due to the collaps" "i in" 
former USSR and the attendant
ideological unt'gon-i'* that pitted it against 
the US in the
cold war "r". 
ptio' to this'era' thesJ suPer powers had
arbitrarily supported unaccountable 
governments across
third World countrles' and even imotsed 
some of their
own. As Am,taegbu 1Zd f i'+S) corroborates' 
"the end of the
Cold War .h"nguJ Jro b'l"nt" of forces 
and removed any
.. *:ll ;r:::i,,;;i',,'".;: muJ:r :; : J;,i" lli:Jflsecurity reasons I Iru)t. Lrru,trrrr'- ;^-^^ ^^.t .ho a.onr'
most of these regimes led to their collapse 
and the doption
of liberal au,ot"tit system' Human rights 
are essential
;;;;";"ts of demociatic, regime-s and are 
given more
attention in the international arena' 
The particular attention
that human rights receive is demonstrated 
by the activities
of the lnternational Criminal Court 
(lCC) and the African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights'
Tronsnational migrotion: The trend 
in the international arena
is the dismantlini-of 
'tu't'ictions 
that had' hitherto' made
free movem"nt o? J""pi"-a'incult' 
The relaxation of national
laws on immigration by most countries' 
in response to the
logic of globalisaiion' op"n"d uP oPP:r:unities 
thatrnade it
possible for people to respond to global 
economic torces
and rocar .on.uln-, la"r** & veseth 2005). 
The direct
implication of relaxei immigration policies 
are the creation
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tcrm diaspora is used to denote a community of citizens
who are domiciled outside the boundaries of their states.
These citizens who find themselves beyond the shores of
rheir homelands form powerful networl<s that have proved
vital in interstate relations' Thus' most countries have
nriniature replications through the diaspora community
across the world. The diaspora have proved to be veritable
sources of diplomatic craftsmanship'
The variables we have enumerated in the preceding section
are only representative of the forces that shape the formulation of
state objectives and, therefore, do not exhaustively cover all. A
point to be noted is that these variables influence the formulation
of state oblectives differentlY.
Environmental Variables, State Obiectives and
Interstate Relations: A Linl<age
The linl<age between environmental variables and state obiectives
lies in their reciprocal relationship. Domestic and external
environmental variables act as the driving force in the formulation
of state obiectives. The contemPorary complexity of the
international system is exemplified by the multiplicity of actors
and overlapping interests. The task before states is how to
balance their objectives and preferences with international
morality. ln other words, the behaviour of states is moderated to
conform to international morality'
As we have enumerated, environmental variables are evident
at the domestic and international levels and both levels have had
direct and indirect effect in motorising the traiectory of foreign
policies of states. But, at the base of how these variables
determine the course of a state's actions is the Power available to
it to drive its objectives. What this implies is that it is not iust
enough to evolve a bouquet of obiectives without the
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comPonential power for their realisation' lf 
a state marshals out
its obiectives withJut to*po'it" capability for their 
pursuit' they
are as good as not formulated at all'
Even though states are theoretically regarded .u.t "iu'l 
in the
international arena, the practical truth is, that :hlt- ]:" 1"t 
tl;
Several indices set countries aPart' The categorisation 
ot
countries by their economic status based 
on their level of
development plays u 'fnifitunt 
role jn determining their place in
the comity of states. FJr the sake of international 
stability, states
exercise their power with due cognizance 
of the interest of r:ther
states. While territorial integrity and protection 
of state
sovereignty constitute the core essence 
of state obiectives' what
determines if a state could live up to this ideal 
are the nesources
at its disposal vis-a-vis the resources at 
the disposal of rival states'
The reconfiguration of the world since the 
end of the cold
war introdu."d 
"n"* 
set of moraiity that placed'.limits on state
sovereignty. State sovereignty was reconceptualised 
from the
prism of poweruna-'nqu"'I'ionable authority 
to that of obligation
of states to behave responsibry in exercising 
authority within their
territories. The United Naiions introduced 
the doctrine of
responsibility to p'ot"tt (R2P) to underline this 
shift in focus'
which was precipitated by gross acts 
of inhumanity in some states'
R2P is preoccupied with' and targets' at 
crimes' These crimes
comprise genocide, war crimes' crimes against 
humanity and
ethnic cleansing. Essentially' R2P is anchored 
on three pillars: the
obligationrnar"'ponsibilityofstatestoProtecttheirpopulation
from mass crimes; the responsibility of the. ..international
communitytoassiststatestofulfilltheirprimaryobligations;and,
the responsibility of the international community 
to intet-vene in
states, where the citizens are in danger and 
governments have
demonstrated incapacity to utt upptopriately' through 
coercive
measures ranging from economic sanctions 
to military
interventions (E-vans 2008; Glanville 2010)'
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,,1 tlrc citizens; the moocl of the international community; the
,,ilpport or otherwise of neighbouring states; compliance or
rror-rcompliance with existing international treaties; and general
opinionofotherSEtes.Thereisincreasingbluntingofterritorial
lines, which mal<es internal affairs of states the concern of the
international community. The unity of the international
communityagainstMuammerGadaffi,theinterventioninMaliand
subsequent restoration of democratic Sovernance in that country
and the sustained interest in the unfolding revolution in Syria are
handy demonstrations of the internationalisation of domestic
issues which exemplify restrictions on the independence of states
in evolving their obiectives'
Conclusion
Thereisnodoubtthatenvironmentalvariablesaremajor
determinants of state obiectives' Because states do not operate 
in
isolation, the formulation of their obiectives is a product of
domesticandexternalenvironment,alvariables.Astate's
obiectivesareoftenhierarchisedintheorderoftheirimportance
and overall affinity with its national interest. states do not iust set
objectivesfortheirsakebutwiththeintensionofrealisingthem.
The realisation of state obiectives in the international arena is
hinged on a state's overt and covert capability
A state's capability is synonymous with the power it wields
both internally and "*iul.n"liy' 
But this Power is wielded in the
arena of competing state interests' Thus' while environmental
variables act as a riotorising force in spawning state obiectives'
their realisation is a function of the national Power of states' The
pointbeingmadeisthatinthearenaofinternationalrelations,
environmental variables engender state obiectives but the
realisation of these obiectivei is embedded in the possession of
national caPabilitY.
lnAfricawhereallmannerofconflictsrangingfltllltttttt,
end inter-elite to inter-group and state versus gl ouP corlllr( r" 'rr
1;r-cvalent, the African Union (AU) introduced 
a nutrrlrt'r ' 'l
changesthatmoveditfromitstraditionalPathS.Sitrtt'11..
rcbra'nding in 2001, the AU shelved its non-interference do( rttt"
and replaied it with the responsibility to Protect by tnrrl'rr"'
provisions for collective action in grave circumstances suclt 'r"
wars, genocide and crimes against humanity (lbeike-Jonah 
2001:J)
The iiplication of all these is the imposed limitations on, rrrrl
debarment of, states from invoking the Powers associated witlr
sovereignty and territorial integrity as basis for acting arbitrarily
and dictatoriallY.
The disparity in economic deveiopment among .stat'es has
alsoimposedlimitationsonst,atebehaviours.Developedcountries
have oiten deployed their economic advanages to elicit certain
statebehavioursfromThirdWorldCountries.Foreignaidand
various policies of multilateral agencies have been deployed to
achievecertaingoalsincludingthereorderingofstateobiectives.
For instance, the debt crlsis of the 1980s which spawned
widespread economic crisis across Third World Countries led to
theinterventionofBrettonWoodsinstitutionsintheir
economies. The reform packages which these countries were
made to implement, especially the structural adiustment
programmes 1infl provided an opening for neoliberal. entrance
that"facilitated glofalisation. The reforms which were hinged on
certain conditionalities effectively compromised the indePendence
ofcountrieswithfar-reachingimplicationforevolvingindependent
state obiectives (Offiong 2001;Onah &Nyewusira 2006)'
There is a recipiocal linkage between the domestic and
external environmental variables in dictating and motorising the
trajectory of state obiectives' The point being made is that the
formulation of state otlectives is never done in isolation because
such objectives must, factor in several issues such as, the support
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